New EU regulations on the need to encrypt personal identifiers for linking data will increase the importance of Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage (PPRL) techniques over the course of the next years. Currently, the use of Anonymous Linkage Codes (ALCs) is the standard procedure for PPRL of medical databases. Recently, Bloom filter-based encodings of pseudo-identifiers such as names have received increasing attention for PPRL tasks. In contrast to most previous research in PPRL, which is based on simulated data, we compare the performance of ALCs and Bloom filter-based linkage keys using real data from a large regional breast cancer screening program. This large regional mammography data base contains nearly 200.000 records. We compare precision and recall for linking the data set existing at point t 0 with new incident cases occuring after t 0 using different encoding and matching strategies for the personal identifiers. Enhancing ALCs with an additional identifier (place of birth) yields better recall than standard ALCs. Using the same information for Bloom filters with recommended parameter settings exceeds ALCs in recall, while preserving precision.
INTRODUCTION
Many medical studies link different databases containing information on the same patient (Jutte et al., 2010) . If unique common identifiers are available, linking is trivial. However, in many situations in practice such unique identification numbers are not available. If privacy is not an issue, probabilistic record linkage based on pseudo-identifiers such as surname, first name, date of birth and address information can be used (Herzog et al., 2010) . Under legal constraints demanding privacy for pseudo-identifiers, privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL, for an overview see (Vatsalan et al., 2013) ) is required.
In general, jurisdictions for linking patient data differ widely. Therefore, the technical details to comply with national legal requirements vary between countries. In the US, the HIPAA rules require the removal of nearly all information used for record linkage. The current legal situation in Europe has made pseudomysation of record linkage identifiers factually mandatory: Due to increasing privacy concerns of the population, the European Council, Parliament and Commission agreed on a new "General Data Protection Regulation" (Council of European Union, 2016), which will be part of the national jurisdictions in all 28 member states of the European Union by May 2018. The regulation clearly demands pseudonymisation techniques able to withstand re-identification attacks, but does not require absolute anonymization.Given this recent development, the demand for PPRL solutions will increase sharply.
Currently, due to the regional and organisational fragmentation of medical health care, the standard setting for medical record linkage is based on a one-timeexchange between otherwise computationally separated organizational units. This constraint restricts the number of potential PPRL solutions to a small subset of the many different PPRL approaches which have been suggested (for a review, see (Vatsalan et al., 2013) ). Nearly all applied PPRL protocols use three types of actors: Two or more data holders, one linkage unit and a research group. In general, in such settings, all units interact only once. Most protocols assume that all partners act according to the protocol (but may keep track of all local computations). This assumption is called 'honest, but curious' or 'semi-honest' model (Goldreich, 2004 ).
For such scenarios, only three approaches for linking medical data have been used repeatedly for realword applications of large medical databases : Using a third-party trustee, using encrypted identifiers 1 and using Bloom-filters.
If a third-party data trustee (Kelman et al., 2002 ) is used, unencrypted patient pseudo-identifiers are transferred to a trusted third party, which links the pseudoidentifiers and assigns a new identification number to the linked records. These newly constructed IDs are then used for linkage by a research group.
By far the most common approach in practical settings is the use of encrypted pseudo-identifiers. Here, the identifiers are concatenated into a single string which is then encrypted. The resulting encrypted string is called an anonymous linking code (ALC, (Herzog et al., 2007) ).
Many of the more recent PPRL approaches (see (Vatsalan et al., 2013; Karapiperis et al., 2016 ) for reviews) have limited scalability, so they can not be used with large datasets. For example, although technically interesting, all homomorphic encryption methods are computationally expensive and do not scale well (Karakasidis et al., 2015) . An exception are Bloom filter approaches. (Schnell et al., 2009 ) first suggested the use of Bloom filters for privacy-preserving record linkage. The approach is based on splitting each identifier into a set of substrings of length 2 (bigrams), which are mapped into a binary vector for each identifier with a linear combination of different cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD-5. The similarity of these binary vectors (Bloom filters) approximates the similarity of the pseudo-identifiers, which makes Bloom filters attractive for error-tolerant PPRL.
Although using separate Bloom filters for each pseudo-identifier is the most common approach, the use of one common binary vector is harder to attack. The use of a single Bloom filter for all identifiers has been first proposed in (Schnell et al., 2011) and has been explored further by (Durham, 2012) . The resulting composite Bloom filter is called a Cryptographic Long-term Key (CLK) in the original publication or 'record based Bloom filter' (RBF) by (Durham, 2012) . CLKs have been used on real world data extensively (Randall et al., 2014; Schnell and Borgs, 2015; Schmidlin et al., 2015) .
1 Although data sets without direct personal identifiers, but containing indirect identifying information such as date of hospital admission and discharge are occasionally suggested (Karmel and Gibson, 2007) for record linkage, they rarely contain enough discriminating information for unique linkage pairs.
Our Contribution. No previous publication compared the performance of CLKs with the performance of the more traditional ALCs using real-world data. Therefore, we report on a new study assessing the performance of different variations of CLKs and ALC variants using real-world data from a large regional breast cancer screening program (Katalinic et al., 2007) . Furthermore, for the first time, we compare the effect of including additional identifiers to linkage keys and Bloom filter encodings.
PREVIOUS WORK
Currently, only two different versions of encoding identifiers seem to be in practical use for PPRL: Anonymous Linkage Codes (ALCs) and Bloom filters. Both will be described shortly.
ALC Variants
ALCs are an encrypted single string formed by concatenating substrings or functions of different pseudoidentifiers. These pseudo-identifiers should be stable over time and free of errors. Most often, first name, surname, date of birth and sex are used for constructing ALCs. The resulting combination of identifiers is encrypted using cryptographic hash functions. The resulting hashed string is used as the linkage key. If two ALCs match exactly, the corresponding records are classified as representations of the same real-world entity. Due to the cryptographic hash function, it is nearly impossible to decrypt the identifiers directly.
The most simple and widely-used ALC is constructed in three steps (Herzog et al., 2007) : all identifiers are preprocessed using a set of rules (for example, removal of non-alphabetical characters from names, removal of non-digits from dates, and capitalization of all characters). The resulting preprocessed identifiers are then concatenated to form one single string, which is finally encrypted with a cryptographic hash function. Examples of applications of Basic ALCs are described by (Kijsanayotin et al., 2007; Schülter et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2010; Tessmer et al., 2011) .
The design of the Basic ALC is not error-tolerant, since even the replacement of a single letter will result in an entirely different hash code. As spelling and typographical errors in patient identifiers are common, many true record pairs will not be classified as matches. Hence patients with variations in their respective identifiers might have different characteristics than patients with agreeing identifiers. Ignoring this problem can result in biased estimates (Ridder and Moffitt, 2007) . Different approaches to constructing ALCs allow for some errors in identifiers. The Swiss Federal Office for Statistics asked the Cryptological Unit of the Swiss Military to develop a privacy-preserving linkage method for medical patient data (Office fédéral de la statistique, 1997).To construct this ALC variation, the Soundex code of surname and first name are created after some preprocessing. The Soundex codes are concatenated with the date of birth and sex. The resulting string is encrypted using a cryptographic hash function (Office fédéral de la statistique, 1997). Applications and reviews of the Swiss ALC are discussed in (Borst et al., 2001; Holly et al., 2005; Eggli et al., 2006; El Kalam et al., 2011) .
Another approach to construct more error-tolerant ALCs was invented by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Their solution uses substrings of first and last names instead of the full string. (Ryan et al., 1999) tested several variations and concluded that the second, third, and fifth character of the surname combined with the characters at the second and third position of the first name concatenated with sex and date of birth performed best. The resulting string forms the Statistical Linkage Key (SLK) which is often included in data published by the AIHW (Karmel et al., 2010) . After applying a cryptographic hash function to the SLK, the Encrypted SLK, sometimes also denoted as 581-Key is the ALC variant that is widely used in Australian data linkage (Taylor et al., 2014) . (Karmel et al., 2010) tested the effect of adding different versions of state and postcode to the 581-Keys. In general, 581-Keys don't seem to be considered as state-of-the-art any longer .
Simple Bloom Filters
Bloom filters have been used for calculating string similarities in privacy-preserving probabilistic record linkage (Schnell et al., 2009) . A Bloom filter is an array of data proposed by Howard (Bloom, 1970) for checking the set membership of records efficiently (Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2003) . It is represented by a bit array with a length of l bits initially set to zero. For the mapping, k independent hash functions h ∈ {h 1 , . . . , h k } are used.To store the set of entities S = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } in the Bloom filter, each element x i ∈ S is hashed using the k independent hash functions. The bit positions given by the hash functions are set to 1. If a bit was already set to 1, nothing is changed.
To store all elements of a set in Bloom filters, we apply the double hashing scheme proposed by (Kirsch and Mitzenmacher, 2006) . They show that using two independent hash functions is sufficient to implement a Bloom filter with k hash functions without an increase in the asymptotic false positive probability (Kirsch and Mitzenmacher, 2006) . Therefore, the positional values of the k hash functions are computed with the function
where i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and l is the length of the bit array. We use two different keyed hash message authentication codes (HMACs), namely, HMAC-SHA1 (h 1 ) and HMAC-MD5 (h 2 ) (Krawczyk et al., 1997) to create the Bloom filters.
Composite Bloom Filters
For some applications, a single linkage key has to be used. If separate Bloom filters are used, for these applications, the set of Bloom filters has to be combined in a composite Bloom filter. Storing all of the identifiers used in a single Bloom filter was first proposed by (Schnell et al., 2011) . This is called a Cryptographic Long-term Key (CLK), since they were intended for use in a longitudinal study of offenders.
For the construction of a CLK, each identifier is split into a set of n-grams. Each set is stored using k hash functions using the same Bloom filter of the length l for all n-gram sets of all identifiers used. This additive Bloom filter represents the CLK.
After preprocessing, first name and surname are split into bigrams, birth year into unigrams. In the second step, the first n-gram set (e.g. first name) is stored in the Bloom filter. Each bigram is hashed k times. Bits having indices corresponding to the hash values are set to one. In the third step, the second ngram set (e.g. surname) is mapped to the same Bloom filter. Finally, unigrams are mapped to the same bit array.
Cryptographic Attacks on ALCs
Frequency attacks on standard ALCs have not been reported in the literature so far. Discussions about the security of ALCs and 581-Keys up to now are hypothetical, not empirical .
However, since the same password is used for all records, within a combination of sex and date of birth, the most frequent name/surname combination will also yield the most frequent ALC. Therefore, given a large random sample, the most frequent name/surname combinations have a high risk of re-identification. Under the (unrealistic) assumption of uniformly distributed dates of birth, age and sexes, there are about 365 * 100 * 2 = 73.000 combinations possible. This way, in a database of 10.000.000 records, about 137 records per combination are expected. If the frequency distribution of names is skewed, aligning the most frequent name subsets could identify a large proportion of the records using this simple frequency alignment.
Cryptographic Attacks on Bloom Filters
Bloom filter-based PPRL has been attacked by two different techniques: by applying a Constrained Satisfaction Solver (CSS) on frequencies of entire Bloom filters (Kuzu et al., 2011; Kuzu et al., 2013) and by a interpreting the Bloom filter bit patterns as a substitution cipher (Niedermeyer et al., 2014) . The first attack is a variant of a simple rank swapping attack (Domingo-Ferrer and Muralidhar, 2016) which used the estimated length of the encrypted strings as additional information. (Kuzu et al., 2011) consider their attack on separate Bloom filters as successful, but not their attack on composite Bloom filters (Kuzu et al., 2013) . It should be noted that this CSS attack is based on the entire data set of Bloom filters, therefore it is no decoding, but an alignment. This way of attack is impossible if many groups of similar cases generates a new bit pattern, for example by using salted encodings (Niedermeyer et al., 2014) . In a salted encoding, a stable identifier such as date of birth, year of birth or place of birth is added to the password determining the hash functions.
The second attack attempted the actual revealing of all identifiers as clear text by a cryptanalysis of individual bit patterns within the Bloom filters (Niedermeyer et al., 2014). This attack is based on the limited number of bit patterns generated by the linear combination of two hash functions in the doublehashing scheme (Kirsch and Mitzenmacher, 2006) of the initial proposal. Exploiting this specific construction of the hash functions, (Niedermeyer et al., 2014) were successful with basic Bloom filters and (Kroll and Steinmetzer, 2015) with CLKs/composite Bloom filters. Therefore, replacing the double-hashing scheme by random hashing should prevent the success of this attack on Bloom filters (Niedermeyer et al., 2014) . Random hashing is based on the idea of using bigrams as seeds for random number streams. This could be implemented by a linear-congruential pseudorandom number generator (LCG, (Stallings, 2014) ), to generate a sequence X with the length k for each n-gram.Random hashing increases the number of possible bit patterns (l = 1000, k = 15) for a given ngram from less than 10 6 to more than 6.8 · 10 32 . Therefore, the Niedermeyer-attack should fail for randomly hashed Bloom filters. This theoretical expectation has been empirically verified by .
In conclusion, for salted Bloom filter encodings using random hashing, no successful attack method is known. Of course, the number of records using the same salt should not exceed the minimum required for a frequency attack either on the whole pattern or the individual attributes mapped to the Bloom filter. Based on experiments reported by , this minimum number seems to be about 300 records. In most medical applications, this number is only exceeded in national databases. For this, an additional salt has to be used. Given this condition, we consider Bloom filter-based encodings as meeting the requirements of the EU Protection Regulation (Council of European Union, 2016) for a pseudonymisation method.
METHODS
Using real data from a German state-wide breast cancer screening program (Katalinic et al., 2007) , we compared the CLK encryption with the Basic and Swiss ALCs and the encrypted SLK (581-Key).
The test data consists of mammography records of patients in a German state, covering about 3.4% of the total German population. File A consists of cases until the end of 2011 (with one record for each case) with n = 138.131 records, file B encompasses cases after 2011 (more than one record per case was possible) with n = 73.004 cases in 198.475 records.
The standard CLK is set up with a length of l = 1000. First name and Surname were padded with spaces before being split into bigrams (Robertson and Willett, 1998) . The other identifiers were split into unigrams. Each set of n-grams is hashed using k = 10 HMACs (Hash functions) and a different cryptographic key. Since CLKs allow for matching strategies other than exact matching (Schnell et al., 2011) , following (Schnell, 2014) , Multibit Trees with various Tanimoto-thresholds were used. The statistical linkage keys were evaluated using exact matching.
The set of identifiers used consisted of first name, surname, date of birth and sex. According to recent studies, including more stable identifiers is desirable (Schnell and Borgs, 2015) . Address information is very volatile, since places of residence may change during the course of a lifetime. Therefore, (Schnell and Borgs, 2015) suggested using places of birth as an additional identifier for Bloom filter-based PPRL. In the second experiment, we did this by adding place of birth to the set of identifiers for the CLKs and 581-Keys.
Since the real-world data sets used here contained only current places of residence, we simulated the place of birth according to German administrative population counts. We introduced artificial 10% address changes to the simulated data. As the two linked files refer to different years, this percentage should reflect a worst-case scenario for the amount of regional mobility in the population.
The current gold standard in use at the cancer screening program is considered as reflecting the true matching status. Based on this classification, the compared methods will yield true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN) and false negative (FN) classifications of record pairs.
This way, we can compare the methods using precision (Precision = TP TP+FP ) and recall (Recall = TP TP+FN ) (Baeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto, 1999).
According to legal requirements, unencrypted identifiers were processed only at the office of the data holder. ALCs, 581-Key and CLKs were generated with Python 3, while R (R Core Team, 2016) was used for the matching and statistical computation. Figures 1 and 2 show the results of the standard CLK (k = 10 hash functions) against the encrypted linkage keys in terms of precision and recall. Lowering the threshold improves the recall. Precision is stable until the threshold approaches 0.88. Above this threshold, precision drops considerably. Given this set of identifiers, CLK does not exceed the performance of the Swiss ALC and the 581-Key.
RESULTS
All in all, ALCs offer higher precision (less false positives) compared to the CLK. However, the CLK outperforms the ALCs in terms of recall as the similarity threshold is lowered below 0.88. At the recommended Tanimoto-threshold of 0.85 , CLKs show more (0.7% -2.8%) true positives than both standard ALC variants (see table 1), even outperforming the 581-Key. However, given this set of identifiers, the amount of false positives is considerably higher. Since CLKs should perform better if more (stable) identifiers are included. Therefore, for the second set of experiments, we included place of birth and hashed it into the original CLKs. We did the same with the 581-Key, concatenating place of birth to the 581-Key before hashing it again. Figures ?? and 4 show that the performance now exceeds the standard ALCs in terms of recall while showing improved precision values. Table 1 lists the detailed classifications in terms of true (TP) and false positive (FP) record pairs, as well as missed record pairs (false negatives (FN)) along with recall and precision at a Tanimoto-threshold of 0.85 for all ALCs, the 581-Key and the CLKs. Details on the results for adding the simulated place of birth It has to be noted that adding the place of birth to the set of identifiers improves the precision for both the 581-Key and the CLKs, while only decreasing recall marginally (likely due to the 10% errors simulated for the birth places). A CLK with birthplace information stored in it outperforms all standard ALC variants and the 581-Key without additional identifiers in both recall and precision.
Since the simulated birth places assumed a worstcase setting of 10% errors in the data, real-world applications using CLKs will benefit from including additional stable identifiers. These results show the potential of using Bloom filters for real-world privacypreserving record linkage applications, especially if additional stable information is available.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we showed a real-world application of the Cryptographic Long-term Key. Previously, ALCs were built by encrypting hashed or sampled identifiers. The CLK, representing an array of bits allows for similarity comparisons using Multibit Trees. The presented simulation results show better recall, but lower precision than best-performing ALCs. Since CLKs can be easily fine-tuned by selecting different thresholds, the impact of linkage errors on substantial results can be easily studied. Therefore, we consider the impact of increased false positives as not limiting the application of CLKs.
Precision and recall of CLKs will exceed ALCs and 581-Keys if more stable identifiers can be used. Recently, showed that the optimal choice of identifiers and parameters is critical for the performance of Bloom filter-based PPRL. Their results vary, depending on the set of identifiers used. They also showed the need for stable identifiers, as errors and missing values (for example, in recent addresses) will reduce recall.
After fine-tuning parameters and identifier sets, PPRL linkage quality comparable to clear text linkage can be achieved with CLKs. Furthermore, using Multibit Trees as suggested by (Schnell, 2014) , PPRL using CLKs can be done (without additional blocking) on standard hardware with two files containing 5 million records each in a little over 4 days . If additional blocks such as date of birth are used, linkage can be done in less than an hour .
Bloom filters can be used to represent other data than strings: (Vatsalan and Christen, 2016) demonstrated the use of numerical and date information, (Farrow and Schnell, 2017) tested the inclusion of distancepreserving locational data. Both techniques will extend the number of possible applications for PPRL.
Currently, there is no known way of attacking CLKs and state-of-the-art variants of single Bloom filters . Therefore, they might be used to link files using personal identifiers according to the de-facto anonymity standard required by the new EU regulation on data protection.
